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Abstract 
Speculation surrounds the JCPOA amonst nearly all of its signatories. This project seeks to 
understand how the agreement commonly known as the “Nuclear Deal with Iran” came into 
being. The relationship between the US and Iran in recent history requires special attention for 
understanding both the difficulty and the significance of reaching the negotiating table. However, 
the other members of negotiations also enabled the process as a whole and had unique national 
interests driving their participation. Analyzing this context and depth of incentives reveals 
political and economic incentives for all seven of the relevant nations. For Iran and 5 of the 
world powers, economic growth drives the soft power initiative. However, the unique situation 
of US-Iran tension suggests the United States cooperated with the deal for political purposes. 
Additionally, the economic need coincides with unique domestic political structures in most of 
the relevant nations. This project considers the US-Iranian relationship from the 1950s in the 
time of the Shah in Iran up to the 2016 presidential elections in the United States in 2016.  
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Executive Summary 
 
With the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015, 
the international community demonstrated a persistent commitment to diplomacy with special 
implications for nuclear and non-proliferation agreements and the bilateral relationships of those 
involved in JCPOA negotiations. Known commonly as the “Iran nuclear deal,” the JCPOA 
brings Iran’s nuclear program under the regulation of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and, from an international standpoint, adds a perceived element of stability to the 
currently volatile Middle East region. The deal faced and continues to strain against opposition 
from many sides and factions within Iran itself, nations involved in the negotiations, and other 
regional actors. However, it also acts as a framework for future nuclear negotiations, proves the 
possibilities of mediation, and suggests room for growth in tense bi-lateral relationships such as 
that of Iran and the United States. This project assembles the historical and diplomatic context of 
the negotiators with the main events of the meetings which resulted in the JCPOA to analyze 
what made the landmark agreement possible. Such an analysis requires consideration of all main 
actors, but the bi-lateral relationship between the United States and Iran requires additional focus 
because of its unique level of tension and subsequent progress in relation to the negotiations.  
To form a complete picture of the JCPOA, this project is split into five sections of 
explanation and analysis: an introduction, historical context, negotiators, timeline, and outlook. 
The methodology of these sections varies slightly but largely consists of contextual analysis with 
events as case studies where applicable. Historical context refers to the main events and 
ideologies making up US-Iran relations from the mid-20th century when the Shah ruled Iran to 
the modern era of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This section provides the necessary background 
for understanding the intensity of the US-Iran dynamic, main events that led to the political 
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freeze, and begins to suggest the significance of both nations signing any kind of diplomatic 
agreement such as the JCPOA. Negotiators refers to the main actors of the diplomatic meetings 
and collaboration that resulted in the agreement, with a focus on each corresponding nation’s 
motivations for signing a nuclear deal. These motivations generally break down into political and 
economic considerations. The timeline outlines significant meetings and events enabling the 
JCPOA’s final form, including the early 200’s meetings between Iran and Europe which act as a 
foundation of the final deal. Finally, outlook presents the main argument for explaining the 
success of the extended negotiations. The main conclusion states that the current generations in 
power in Iran and the United States reflect similarly divided political climates which aligned on 
the side of international cooperation for this period of negotiation.  
Aggregating the context and corresponding diplomacy of the JCPOA agreement and 
negotiations offers insight on a significant political shift. Though the US and Iran remain largely 
at odds with each other, these elements of the JCPOA suggest an alternative path of international 
discussion may be alive in each country. Therefore, the agreement goes beyond its nuclear focus 
and extends into both domestic and international politics. This project highlights the new step of 
communication to identify the generations and changes that make an agreement such as the 
JCPOA possible despite recent history between the main actors. In the long term, these insights 
can extend beyond current political regimes into a general trend toward productive interaction. In 
some cases, the interaction will likely take the form of direct economic cooperation, though other 
bilateral relationships such as that of the United States and Iran are expected to remain limited.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
The recent global nuclear deal with Iran, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA), suggests the beginning of serious shifts in inter-state relations. Of 
particular interest is the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, 
a relationship virtually frozen in sanctions and political disagreement since the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution. Though the sanctions persist and diplomatic relations remain strained where they 
exist at all, this deal marks tangible interaction and cooperation of the two countries, an 
extremely rare occurrence in the last 38 years. The US retains significant influence in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, constituting a major international actor through its arms 
sales and diplomatic ties to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Gulf states, primarily. Since the 
revolution, this influence has typically manifested opposite the national interests of Iran, 
enforcing the rifts solidified in 1979.  
Occasionally, regional conflicts have resulted in the confluence of the states’ national 
interests, such as recent developments in the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq. Diplomacy 
regarding these matters proved arduous (source this), and it is significant that they played out in 
third nations. These instances of confluence act almost as proxy to direct cooperation between 
Iran and the US, since they deal with regional conflicts rather than the relationship of the two 
countries themselves. This emphasizes the significance of the JCPOA as a positive diplomatic 
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progression dealing uniquely with the countries’ direct relationship. A warming of the diplomacy 
between the two nations holds the potential to disrupt current balances of power through the 
manner that the US works politically and economically with the Middle East region as a whole, 
proving this change in communication a significant development.  
 In order to gauge the likelihood of any such warming and understood how it came to be, 
this paper seeks to analyze the JCPOA in light of the negotiations which formed it. These 
negotiations consist of both the conversations that ultimately led to the creation of the agreement, 
as well as the primary motivations of each major actor involved. To understand the full impact, a 
contextual review of the United States-Iranian relationship serves to outline the reasons for the 
current tensions, namely the diverging perspectives leading up to and surrounding the Iranian 
revolution of 1979. Such a review defines the sources of conflict and tension and provides the 
perspective of each nation. These points in turn suggest what may need to change in order for 
each state to reconsider its opposition to the other, as well as beginning to define the economic 
and political magnitude of any potential warming.  
An analysis of the recent negotiations and the events which enabled the dialogue will 
highlight, on the Iranian side, an analysis of the political factions within the country and the 
motivations behind the political actors seeking increased conversation and change. The 
hypothesis is that these motivations include strategic geopolitical actions in response to current 
tensions and wars in the Middle East, effectiveness of US and international sanctions on Iran, 
and/or political transformations in one or both countries. This last point naturally requires 
research into the United States’s political landscape and any significant alterations in its plans 
regarding action and its role in MENA.  
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With respect to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action itself, which constitutes the bulk 
of this analysis, key points include what the talks and agreements mean for each nation, 
including the pros and cons of signing onto the deal. This seeks to explain how agreements made 
parallel to the deal came to be and whether they would have been possible without the 
international collaboration of the JCPOA. Finally, this project seeks to hypothesize whether the 
JCPOA does indeed demonstrate the potential for increasing interaction between the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the United States, or whether their participation is negligible in regard to 
their inter-state relations and the outlook remains stagnant. The initial hypothesis is that the 
agreement is a result of progression in each state’s national interests that can guide the nations 
toward greater cooperation, but that further developments will remain sluggish due largely to the 
generation of political actors of each country. As these generations see increasing turnover, the 
relationship can expect, or at least effectively work toward, greater cooperation. The JCPOA 
serves as a sign of this upcoming, though not yet present, full potential.  
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Chapter 2 
Historical Context of US-Iran Relations: Relevant events and ideologies from the era of the 
Shah to the 1979 Iranian Revolution 
 
 
 
 
The conflicts, tensions, and opinions leading up to and surrounding the 1979 revolution 
continue to characterize US-Iran relations today. This revolution marked a drastic change in the 
countries’ policies, with Iran quickly changing from one of the US’s greatest allies to one of its 
greatest perceived threats. For Iran, the change signified the ultimate independence from foreign 
Western influence and a significant step toward true national sovereignty. Prior to Iran’s current 
Islamic Republic, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi led the government as the second, and 
ultimately final, figurehead of the Pahlavi dynasty, and he did so with the full support of the 
United States for decades. This time marked the height of the US-Iran alliance through the twin-
pillar policy, where Saudi Arabia and Iran were purportedly defining actors in the US’s planned 
alliances. The perceived goal of these alliances was the maintenance of the US’s prominent 
influence in the MENA region. From the US perspective, the need arose out of Cold War fears in 
the superpower balance with the Soviet Union. As the two largest nations, economically and 
geographically, in MENA, these nations presented a strong regional presence which the US 
wanted to set up friendly relationships with and use for mutual advantage. For Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, the alliance offered assistance in establishing the nations’ own regional power and 
influence, enhanced by the technical support of advanced US arms and the political will of the 
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superpower. Sanati draws the parallel as US desires toward global hegemony in comparison to 
Iran’s search for regional hegemony1.   
One interpretation of these benefits is that they were short-lived, and although there was 
potential for the US international interest to coincide with the “twin-pillars”’ interests, there was 
also room for drastic separation. The global hegemonic goals of the United States clashed with 
the regional desires of Saudi Arabia and Iran, causing the powers to oppose and act against each 
other. This could stem from feelings of international manipulation, or baser problems of 
economy and geopolitics. In this understanding of events, the geopolitical developments in 
MENA manifested in the divide between the US and Iran, turning the relationship into an 
ideological battle playing out in the entirety of the region. However, Saudi Arabia’s maintenance 
of its relationship with the US shows that convergence was also possible. 
 Some argue that the twin-pillar plan overstates US concern with Saudi Arabia, and that 
Iran was the foremost goal of US efforts in forming Middle East alliances2. Regardless of the 
magnitude affiliated with each policy, the importance of establishing Iran as an ally in opposition 
to the Soviet Union so overwhelmed US considerations that Iran was able to play the threat of 
turning to the Soviets to bend US policy in its own favor. The strongest example of this would be 
the Shah’s arms deal which Nixon agreed to, then forced his own government’s compliance in 
implementation. One interpretation of this manipulation and the ultimately divergent paths of 
Saudi Arabia and Iran’s opinions on how best to address the US suggests that Iran separated its 
national interest from the global superpower more successfully because it existed as a stronger 
                                                 
1 Sanati, Reza. “Beyond the domestic picture: the geopolitical factors that have formed 
contemporary Iran-US relations.” Global Change, Peace & Security. vol. 26, no. 2. pp. 126. 
Taylor & Francis.  
2 McGlinchey, Stephen. “Richard Nixon’s Road to Tehran: The Making of the U.S. Arms 
Agreement of May 1972.” Diplomatic History. vol. 37, no. 4. pp. 841-860. Oxford Jounrals.  
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nation-state than Saudi Arabia3. The Shah’s ability to confer his importance to Nixon and 
solidify the arms deal that defined the relationship directly before the revolution provides one 
example of the Iranian state’s ability to operate fully in the face of the superpower counterpart.  
Unfortunately for the Shah and the US’s comfortable status quo, arms agreements could 
not atone for decreasing political freedom and economic opportunities. Repression and inflation 
served as a constant reminder of the Shah’s shortcomings as a statesman, and when compounded 
with the public’s perception of the Shah’s increasing “Western” materiality, public frustration 
escalated steadily. The Shah’s insufficiencies alienated his public enough to cause mass riots in 
1978 and ultimately the revolution in 1979. Multiple divisions of the Iranian population found 
cause in the Shah’s repressive policies, economic failures, personal opulence, and the perception 
that the West in general, and the United States in particular, acted as the ruler’s puppeteer4.  
Emphasizing the role of the West and the US became a rallying cry of the religious and 
traditionalist arms of the revolution as they attempted to consolidate support and power. It was a 
particularly effective strategy because it played off pre-existing and deeply rooted sentiments of 
nationalism in the face of global power intervention. Iran has a deep history of foreign control 
across the political, economic, and military realms of its state. The origins can be traced 
conservatively to the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, when modern-day Iran still identified as 
Persia, then consistently followed through the nation’s growth up to 20th century capitulations 
                                                 
3 Ibid.  
4 This report focuses on the relevant perceptions and role of the United States. For more 
comprehensive reviews of the tensions, complaints, and events of the Iranian revolution, see 
Zaman, M. Q.’s The ulama in contemporary Islam: Custodians of change and Kurzman, C.’s 
Structural opportunity and perceived opportunity in social-movement theory: The Iranian 
revolution of 1979.  
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and interventions5. The prevalence and extent of these interventions, which often clearly served 
only the benefits of the invading country, integrated a demeaning tone to international relations 
in Iran. It was a global abuse of power and lack of balance that helped to ultimately alienate 
Iranians from foreign intervention and aid. These ideas led to the extreme opposition to a US 
presence characteristic of the Islamic Republic. Regardless of potential gains from cooperation 
with the United States, the revolutionary forces manipulated frustration with Western influence 
into an ideological principle of their new government, and acted with corresponding force (i.e. 
hostage crisis). 
The anti-West and nationalist rhetoric recalled two emotionally-charged (and largely 
justified) grievances: historical objections to British control and the more recent and highly 
contested overthrow of Prime Minster Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953. Equating the US with 
Britain brought the former into a legacy of exploitation defined in modern times by oil 
concessions. Oil concessions were perhaps the application of the abuse, but the ideological 
principles of control in the defiance of Iranian sovereignty truly define the principles that the 
traditionalists managed to capitalize. It was an appeal that crossed societal sectors and ultimately 
assisted in power consolidation, largely due to the manifestation of the demeaning atmosphere 
explained above. 
The US had retained a degree of separation from the stigma of Western intervention in its 
earlier interactions with Iran in part because of a shared history of defying British control. The 
United States stood as an example of an advanced nation that had thrown off foreign influence in 
a relatively efficient and successful manner. Perhaps more importantly, that personally achieved 
national independence grew into a strategic and respected place within the world order. 
                                                 
5 Mirfendereski, Guive. The Privileged American: the U.S. Capitulations in Iran 1856-1979. 
Mazda Publishers, 2014.  
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Therefore, the US could act as a model for Iran in its rebuilding attempts of the 20th century. For 
example, Iran welcomed American economic advisors as early as 1911 when the Majles 
appointed American William Morgan Shuster as treasurer-general, then again with the advising 
of Arthur Millspaugh over Iran’s financial sector6. Though the American government did not 
send the aid directly, they encouraged qualified members of the private sector to assist, and the 
Iranians in turn placed these men in position of relative importance in their fledgling 
government. The terms ended due to British and Russian interference, which Shuster especially 
condemned as gross violations of Iran’s sovereignty. These men, however, showed the initial 
respect inherent in US-Iran relations and the potential for the two to build together. In other 
words, the United States was meant to be the Western model to defy history, a role the US failed 
progressively and completely. This failure was a gradual process with loose origins in the 
Second World War. But the defining moment coincides with the traditionalists’ national appeal: 
the fall of Mosaddeq. 
Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq retains renown as Iran’s foremost precedent of 
democracy. He came to power through legitimate needs and is perhaps best well-known for his 
work to re-nationalize Iran’s oil industry. In seeking to abolish Britain’s remaining oil 
concessions, Mossadeq affirmed his position as an Iranian nationalist truly taking the impetus of 
the country’s sovereignty. It was, therefore, particularly notable when in 2013 the CIA public 
acknowledged their fundamental role in his overthrow 60 years prior. This acknowledgement 
authenticated decades of Iranian claims of American orchestration of the coup, which on the 
larger scale, affirmed the US as a hypocritical actor in terms of its relations with Iran. The 
American duplicity, largely accepted as fact in Iran prior to the intelligence agency’s admission, 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
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provided an apt example to the traditional revolutionists anti-West/US rhetoric. With these ideas, 
the factions of the revolution could have a common enemy and cause against foreign hypocrisy, 
as well as justification for their distrust of the international system as a whole. The lack of 
repercussions for the global powers allowed the Marxists of Iran to highlight the idea that 
“international law was simply one ideological weapon in the bourgeois arsenal of oppression”7. 
Since Iran was already acting on its aforementioned goals of national and regional influence, the 
mobilization proved largely effective and the US became the new enemy, with Britain slipping 
into the past. This was a particularly impactful change in relations because of the hopes and 
close-knit ties of Iran and the US in previous nation-building and supporting initiatives. The 
conflicts were ultimately more personal than a general Western evil ideology. The leftist lead in 
condemning the attack also helps add context to the cross-sector appeal of the later cry of the 
traditionalists.  
It was the full impact of the cry against the West that resulted in the hostage crisis amidst 
the revolution. When students took hold of the US embassy in Tehran, they had no direct ties to 
the religious revolutionaries who were simultaneously cementing their role as the new ruling 
elite. However, their use of nationalism and anti-US rhetoric likely added ideological legitimacy 
to the takeover and influenced the extended time of the crisis. Additionally, Ali points out that 
students, especially those educated in the United States, already moved within a revolutionary 
atmosphere and contempt for power. With the United States struggling with Nixon’s Watergate 
scandal and the country’s controversial escalation of the Vietnam War, much of the youthful 
generation of the United States was feeling a similar contempt to their counterparts in Iran. The 
feelings compounded primarily in the 1960’s, also the culmination of frustration with the Shah.  
                                                 
7 Ansari, Ali M. Confronting Iran: the failure of American foreign policy and the next great 
crisis in the Middle East. pg. 30. Basic Books: Perseus Book Group, 2006.  
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Therefore, the leftist and student-led opposition groups that ultimately participated in the 
revolution held many frustrations against governmental abuse of power. This allowed for the 
temporary unifying element within the revolutionary factions. Unfortunately, the temporary 
nature of the unity had long-lasting effects on the international stage. Misunderstanding and 
miscommunication surrounding the Iranian hostage crisis can be seen as representative of the 
overarching trend in US-Iran relations since the advent of the Islamic Republic8. One important 
element to note is the difference of perspective between the US and Iran. While the media 
outsourced the crisis to the American public and stirred outrage, Iranians debated a sense of 
retribution for years of intrusion by foreign nations’ policies. Though ultimately understood as a 
wrong, the full impact on the American psyche was undervalued by the Iranians, just as the 
Americans underestimated Iranian unrest over their previous transgressions. In this way, the two 
nations established a norm of “just missing” each other in their understandings and policy 
attempts.  
Addition examples of tension and aggravations include the Contra Affair, the missed 
opportunity of former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami’s speech before the United 
Nations9, and former US president George W Bush’s inclusion of Iran as part of the “axis of 
evil”. Ansari (convincingly) attempts to categorize these miscommunications into international 
theory by assessing the similar educational background of the actors in each nation. He argues 
that many of the Iranian nationals had received realist-centered educations in the West before 
returning to Iran, and therefore expected the United States to act along the principles of realism. 
                                                 
8 For additional information on the hostage crisis, see Farber, D.’s 2009 Taken hostage: The Iran 
hostage crisis and America’s first encounter with radical Islam and Brulé, D.J.’s 2005 
Explaining and forecasting leaders’ decisions: A poliheuristic analysis of the Iran hostage 
rescur decision.  
9 Ibid. supra note 7. Chapter 5.  
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However, the United States’ response proved reactionary and ideological rather than realist, 
especially after the public’s access to the hostage crisis. This outlines a fundamental disconnect 
in expectations versus reality from both sides of the relations. With such complex and close-knit 
history to this fundamental conflict of understanding as a foundation, most attempts at diplomacy 
were brushed aside by the receiving nation. It took time and a “perfect storm” of political actors 
at each national level to be able to come to the international agreement that came to be known as 
the JCPOA. 
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Chapter 3: 
Negotiator Motivations: primary actors’ motivations and contributions to JCPOA negotiations 
 
 
 
 
The primary negotiating actors of the JCPOA (excluding Iran) can be described as the 
P5+1 and EU or the EU/E3+3. The first description highlights the UN Security Council 
affiliation while the second emphasizes the role of the European Union. Regardless of 
descriptive form, the countries involved were Russia, China, the United States, France, Britain, 
Germany, an EU representative and Iran itself. Germany and the EU participated in the JCPOA 
negotiations because of their active role in earlier nuclear diplomacy with Iran prior to the US, 
China and Russia becoming fully involved. The group taken as a whole may hide some of the 
international dynamics at play. For example, France, Germany, Britain, and the EU 
representative naturally held coinciding motivations and intentions because of their common 
European identity10.  
However, a second dynamic appears between these European countries and the United 
States, frequent allies. From the ally partitioning, Iran, Russia, and China form a second side of 
negotiations. Though the relationships also contain complex histories, Russia and China align 
with Iran on economic and international issues more frequently than the “Western” negotiators. 
This is not to say that there was a clear divide between East and West during the negotiations, 
                                                 
10 “Statement by France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States and the High Representative 
of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Post-JCPOA Business with 
Iran.” European Union External Action. 19 May 2016. 
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but begins to reveal a few of the dynamics and motivations, as well as how the countries may 
have aligned on certain points of contention during negotiations due to their pre-existing 
alliances. Additional insight can be drawn from a more detailed review of the main negotiating 
countries’ actors and motivations for completion of the nuclear deal. 
 
Russia 
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov 
 All of the countries or “powers” involved in the negotiations shared the goal of a 
diplomatically settled nuclear deal. However, in Russia there was some debate over the 
economic repercussions of such a change in global relations with Iran. Russia’s defense and 
private companies, in the energy sector in particular, perceive Iran as potential growth territory11 
12. Conversely, the level of investment Russia expects to sustain in Iran is not enough to 
overcome the negative economic impacts of additional foreign sanctions on non-nuclear actions. 
Other countries, primarily in Asia, also maintain economic relations with Iran and prevent a 
Russian monopoly on investment opportunities13. Additionally, similarities between Russian and 
Iranian oil product pit the two as export competitors, and Russia benefitted from European and 
UN sanctions against Iran’s oil market14. Therefore, fewer sanctions and a return to oil trade 
between Europe and Iran would hurt Russia’s share of the market. Together, these factors result 
in a level of ambiguity over the economic returns to the JCPOA in Russia and the need to 
consider other motivations for assisting or blocking a deal. 
                                                 
11 Kramer, Andrew. “An Embargo and a Boon.” The New York Times. Feb 16 2012. 
12 Khlopkov, Anton. “JCPOA and Russia’s Interests in the Iranian Nuclear Market.” Moscow 
Defense Brief. Apr 2016. CAST 
13 Maloney, Suzanne. “Three Reasons Why Russia Won’t Wreck the Iran Nuclear Negotiations.” 
The Brookings Institution. Mar 25 2014.  
14 Ibid. footnote 1 
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 Russia’s security and geostrategic concerns push the debate largely onto the side of 
cooperation in the agreement. The primary outside view of the JCPOA is that it is a stabilizing, if 
temporary, deal. Russia’s proximity to Iran and the recently volatile Middle East, as well as its 
own border controversies with Ukraine and the area of Crimea, exacerbate the desire for a 
stabilizing force in the region15. Relative to its neighbors, Iran is a consistent and central figure 
in the MENA. Therefore, Russia has good reason to pursue diplomatic and even friendly 
relationships with whichever regime is currently in place16. This is especially true since Iran’s 
weapon capabilities extend far enough to reach Russia easily should the relations sour 
dramatically, and so limiting that potential to non-nuclear risk holds obvious appeal. Non-
proliferation is also generally a tenet of Russia’s international preferences, and so there is little 
reason for them to pursue an opposite policy in a neighboring country. Ina addition to the appeal 
of regional stability, Russia and Iran share national goals and perspectives for their roles in the 
international community and MENA region.  
 Russia and Iran share a relatively unique appreciation for the other’s reasoning because 
of their similar aspirations regarding the world order and complaints of the current balance. Both 
seek autonomy and recognition of their power and potential role as an international political 
actor. Russia can prove its willingness to contribute constructively by helping to form a 
successful diplomatic agreement on the global stage that is the JCPOA negotiations17. It is a step 
toward the status of “power” that the country has sought since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. The JCPOA negotiations present an opportunity for normalcy and patience in 
                                                 
15 Paulraj, Nansi. “The JCPOA and Changing Dimensions of the Russia-Iran Relations.” 
Contemporary Review of the Middle East. vol. 2, no. 1, 2016. pp. 95-110. SAGE.  
16 Borshchevskaya, Anna. “Russia’s Cooperation on the Iran Deal is No Favor to Washington.” 
The Washington Institute. Jul 7 2016. 
17 Ibid.  
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negotiations, a more internationally respected platform than Putin’s reputation of reactionary 
history. The importance of Russia’s involvement also pulls from their understanding of Iran. The 
two have a relatively rare relationship of begrudging respect between the current regimes, despite 
a tenuous history that could topple relations if handled without care18. Because of this 
relationship, it is possible that Iran would not be willing to debate as candidly without Russia’s 
presence and understanding, making Russia an essential actor. In fact, the current US President 
at the time, Barack Obama, recognized that role, saying “we would have not achieved this 
agreement had it not been for Russia’s willingness to stick with us.”19. Russia can, in turn, use 
that need to promote their own image and pull in future world order negotiations.  
 
People’s Republic of China 
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Foreign Minister Wang Yi 
 China is the second primary actor with a perceived understanding of, or perhaps 
sympathy for, Iran’s positions and negotiating requirements. In fact, there is an argument that 
China pushed Russia enough to overcome the latter’s qualms on the economic gains and losses 
from an Iranian nuclear agreement20. This intense desire to see the deal go through likely stems 
from perceived Chinese diplomatic and economic gains. As the negotiating power with the least 
contentious bilateral relations with Iran, China’s history and existing economic policies suggest 
they may be able to expand a cooperative and friendly bilateral relationship, at least within the 
limits of United States scrutiny.   
                                                 
18 Trenin, Dmitri. “Russia and Iran: Historic Mistrust and Contemporary Partnership.” Carnegie 
Moscow Center. Aug 18 2016 
19 Friedman, Thomas L. “Obama Makes His Case on Iran Nuclear Deal.” The New York Times. 
Jul 14 2015. 
20 Baev, Pavel K. “The China factor in Russian support for the Iran deal.” The Brookings 
Institution. Jul 21 2015. 
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 Prior to 1997, China contributed the most direct aid to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
However, a change in the Chinese global policy regarding nuclear acquisition became necessary 
when they signed the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), and this aid largely stopped21. For 
approximately the last two decades then, China’s view of nuclear power centered on security, a 
perspective that continues regarding Iran’s nuclear abilities. This security perspective works 
alongside China’s self-defined foreign policy principles, which emphasize sovereignty and non-
intervention, and in tandem with adherence to the principles of the UN Charter22. The security 
focus holds special significance for China’s interests in the Middle East because the region holds 
strong economic potential for the nation. Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon, for example, 
could incite a military response from Israel, causing extreme conflict for those living in the 
MENA and area and economic distress for those invested in it. To prevent such a struggle for 
power, China works to create a balance in its relations, avoiding sides in the primary Arab-Israeli 
and Sunni-Shia divides which often define the Middle East23. Such a balance and near-neutrality 
poses a maintenance challenge, but the economic incentive is a strong motivation. 
 Both China and Iran place great value in their history, including past national actions and 
foreign interactions24. Unlike the US and Russia, who (from the Iranian perspective at a 
minimum) betrayed Iran in the ousting of Mossadeq and Treaty of Turkmenchay, respectively, 
China’s empire lay far enough from Persia that relationships managed to remain trade-based and 
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cordial rather than territorial25. This is true more generally in that there is no ugly imperial 
history in the MENA region at the hands of the Chinese power. This stable foundation highlights 
the unique and valuable nature of Sino-Iranian diplomacy, and led to repeated comments during 
JCPOA negotiations that the deal would be impossible without China’s drive and support26. In 
fact, this is true of most, if not all, international policies directed to Iran. With China’s influence 
and share of the economy, the nation’s unity on efforts such as sanctions proves essential for 
meaningful impact27. This is true because of China’s position as the second largest economy in 
the world and more specifically as Iran’s largest export destination28.  
 Potential areas of expanding economic cooperation concentrate in the investment and 
security sectors as evidenced by previous actions of the two states. One example of existing 
security cooperation is the Chinese navy’s public appearance in Iran’s ports in recent years, 
previously considered taboo but now tolerated by the international community29. Given this pre-
existing relationship, it is a reasonable jump to consider additional points of security partnership. 
The Middle East Institute suggests that this would take the form of defense systems sales since 
China specialized select systems to counter US-made weaponry. Security is also a natural Sino-
Iran partnership as opposed to technology at large, where Europe would hold appeal as the most 
advanced producers30. In addition, China temporarily encouraged Iran’s bid to join the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization31. Though China later rejected the bid, the initial verbal support 
suggests a level of willingness to negotiate investment opportunities. These, admittedly slight, 
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points of cooperation may also play into China’s larger international strategy of the “One Belt, 
One Road” policies. Prior to signing the deal, Iran and China shared proposals under this policy, 
which could be expanded and accomplished with greater ease given increased cooperation and 
less international scrutiny. Such investments would follow the outlines of “One Belt, One Road,” 
and would likely include investment in energy, infrastructure development, and finance. China 
has the income flexibility to take on such a role in Iran, in contrast to Russia’s weakened 
economy32.  
 It is also worth noting that international backlash for significant cooperation with Iran is 
expected to persist even as the nuclear deal progresses. Despite the JCPOA as a sign that Iran-US 
relations possess the potential to improve, it is a small step in the overall tensions of the two 
nations. For example, Iran will still face strict US sanctions for human rights violations and 
missile actions. Therefore, any country forming new security and business bonds with Iran will 
need to balance the economic and stability opportunities with the risk of alienating the United 
States. Since the US remains the world’s largest economy, a loss in relations holds greater risk 
for most nations than the benefits of working with Iran. One repercussion of this dynamic is that 
China will likely feel more comfortable making military arrangements with Iran than Europe 
because they have less direct ties to the United States and would be less cautious about 
exacerbating US tensions33. On the other hand, China must also consider the economic fallback 
of upsetting the US, and may ultimately limit their expansion into Iran to avoid such a problem34. 
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France 
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius 
 As EU members (at the time of negotiating and signing the JCPOA), the remaining 
negotiators (Britain, France, Germany, and the EU representative) largely share motivations for 
the nuclear deal. However, France stands out as the hardliner of the negotiations overall, with 
stricter requirements and stances than even the United States, notorious for tense bilateral Iranian 
relations and predicted to be the staunchest negotiator35. Evidence of France’s adamancy appears 
most strongly in initial talks in 2013. There was a strong push by the United States to sign a deal 
with Iran, but France effectively stymied the process, saying it was rushed and too weak to 
contain the nuclear threat36. This hardline stance continued into the final months of negotiations 
two years later, as even in March 2015 France warned of the risks when pushing a deal through 
to meet a deadline37. France’s strict diplomacy on this issue stems from its national political 
trends and its recent experience with Iran’s nuclear program. With Sarkozy’s selection to the 
presidency, France significantly increased its hardline stances internationally and took greater 
use of military power in its stances. Despite disagreement on many political debates, Sarkozy’s 
successor Hollande largely continues this trend and uses the crackdown approach to maintain 
France’s influence in the world order38. The harsh positions stand in strict contrast to French 
policies of the early 2000’s, when the nation opposed the Iraq war and suffered from a weak 
reputation on using its force.  
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 Despite a departure from the diplomacy strategies of the early 2000’s, this was also a 
significant time in France’s involvement in Iran’s nuclear development. In 2002-3, France 
initiated the European effort to form a nuclear deal with Iran. They garnered British support by 
requesting the stoppage of uranium enrichment in the hopes it would bring the United States on 
board as well. The French decided to initiate the negotiations after the revelation that Iran 
violated previous agreements and lied about its actions by building the Fordow Fuel Enrichment 
Plant in secret. Fordow caused immense international backlash, but for France it also acted as a 
reminder of 30 years of tensions over Iran’s nuclear program. France, like the US, was an early 
investor in Iran’s nuclear program under Reza Shah Pahlavi. This relationship fell apart and 
became a violent conflict over investment in Eurodif39 40. With the discovery of Fordow, France 
was reminded of Iranian duplicity over this previous conflict and a deep mistrust grew again. 
This presents an additional reason France took such a hardline stance during later negotiations. 
Unfortunately, temporary suspension of nuclear activities fell through when hardliner 
Ahmadinejad took the Iranian presidency41. However, the strict French guidelines and repeated 
returns to the negotiating table also show the nation’s persistence in creating a deal.  
Their hardline stance reflects strict adherence to national interests in overall international 
diplomacy, but also a deep commitment to the non-proliferation regime and an open economy. 
Diplomat and former French director for strategic affairs, security and disarmament (2000-3) 
Gérard Araud lists sustaining the non-proliferation regime as one of two primary reasons France 
revived nuclear diplomatic relations with Iran in the early 2000s. He argues that Iranian 
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acquisition of nuclear weapons would escalate tensions in the MENA region and result in either 
an attack by nuclear-enabled Israel or additional proliferation by Iran’s neighboring countries42. 
This would threaten both France’s balance in the world order and stability in the region. France’s 
current foreign policy also favors the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. Existing 
arms deals and relationships would be threatened if not destroyed by even more violent conflict 
in the Middle East43. Additionally, the nuclear deal could allow France to pursue a similar 
relationship with Iran, or at least the beginning of one. With advantages in the energy and 
transport sectors, fewer international sanctions on Iran holds opportunity for France financially44. 
Expanding their balance of diplomacy in the region and exploring these economic options likely 
contribute to France’s continued participation in nuclear negotiations and ultimate willingness to 
compromise.  
 
Germany 
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank Walter-Steinmeier 
 In its relationship with Iran, Germany largely stands with the international community. 
This includes the use of sanctions and condemning Iranian human rights abuses. However, 
Germany also seems to attempt a balancing act between this allegiance to the international stance 
and exploring economic opportunities45. Compared to other European nations, Germany has 
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enjoyed a strong economic relationship with Iran in the past46. However, the strength peaked 
with former heads of state in both countries. Since 2009, Germany has largely reflected the 
international community’s decisions and opinions of Iran, shifting the balance to the diplomatic 
politics and away from monetary incentives47. In other words, Germany acts in unison with the 
UN and supports the use of sanctions as a response to Iran’s nuclear activities48.  
 Despite this context for the most recent negotiations, former policies that favored both 
states economically remain recent enough that Germany was able to act as a go-between for Iran 
and the other European nations. Germany’s overall relationship with Iran since the revolution in 
1979 proved positive enough to maintain a level of trust between the two nations. This is 
especially obvious since Germany’s Economy Minister was the first European power to fly to 
Tehran and begin talks of sanction relief and new joint business ventures after the deal was 
signed49. Without an European nation with decent bilateral relations with Iran, it is possible the 
East-West divide of the world powers would have been insurmountable. Instead, Germany’s 
recent allegiance to the international standards balanced effectively with its economic 
cooperation with Iran and allowed the nation to take part effectively and productively in the 
negotiations. This was an especially significant development for Germany since it is not a 
permanent member of the security council of the United Nations.  
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United Kingdom 
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Philip 
Hammond 
 The United Kingdom’s relationship regarding Iran and nuclear negotiations with the 
country can be summed into three main areas: past imperialism, large EU economy50, and United 
States’ ally. In some ways, Iran-UK bilateral relations are marred with a past similar to the of 
Iran with the United States and Russia. Prior to the era of the Shah, Iran felt misguided and 
abused by the imperial powers of Russia and Britain. Ever since, relations have been strained, 
with diplomacy halted and embassies removed periodically. This sets a foundation of mistrust 
and disillusionment for all present opportunities for cooperation. 
 As an EU member, and a significant portion of the EU’s economy, the UK does have 
financial interest in a more collaborative relationship with Iran. These interests overlap with 
EU’s general motivation to seal a nuclear deal, and circulate primarily around the lessening of 
international sanctions. The UK promotes active participation and competition in the global 
economy, and so the large consumer market and desire for foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Iran offer a prominent new venture area51. Additionally, Iran is the Middle East’s second largest 
economy after Saudi Arabia despite current sanctions. These economic elements poise Iran for 
vast economic growth with a freer market. The UK would capitalize on this potential in the 
sectors of infrastructure, healthcare, retail, airports and aviation, mining, and water52. 
 From a political standpoint and the more vocalized motivation, the UK’s relationship 
with the US and a corresponding emphasis on safety is more prominent than national economic 
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gains. This can be seen in France’s political strategy in early 2000’s negotiations and more recent 
rhetoric from the UK’s prime minister and ambassador to the UN. In the 2002-3 negotiations, 
France targeted British safety concerns when forming its hardline stances because British support 
had a high potential for bringing the United States on board with the diplomacy as well53. United 
States’ support was essential for a lasting agreement because it has especially tense bilateral 
relations with Iran, as explained above. This makes the US more likely to impose secondary 
sanctions that would hurt third nations trading with Iran. The close partnership between the UK 
and US make the two a natural pair in negotiations, and the EU used its economic ties to the UK 
to help garner political support in the US. This process is reflected again in more recent 
negotiations with UK figureheads references to safety, not money. 
 In his supporting statements of the JCPOA, UK Ambassador to the UN Mission Matthew 
Rycroft emphasizes the significance of the deal in relation to MENA regional stability. He 
presents the nuclear agreement as a stabilizing factor for proliferation and a starting point for 
future negotiations on other regional concerns such as migration and narcotics54. Prime Minister 
David Cameron emphasizes similar points in an interview with NBC, when he emphatically 
states that the most likely alternative to the JCPOA is Iran’s quick acquisition of a nuclear 
weapon. Cameron emphasizes the regional balances this kind of weaponry would exacerbate and 
reiterates that the non-proliferation agreement operates along safety standards and validation 
checks, as opposed to trust mechanisms55. These rhetorical supports for the Iran nuclear deal 
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closely mirror US concerns over safety standards and other violent conflicts in the MENA 
region, suggesting that US and UK political motivations for peaceful nuclear negotiations with 
Iran are the closest of the main negotiating partners.  
 
Europe/European Union 
Head Delegate to Negotiations: EU High Representative Federica Mogherini 
[Early negotiations: former EU High Representative Catherine Ashton] 
 In addition to a general stance of non-proliferation, Europe used the JCPOA negotiations 
as a chance to demonstrate the region’s ability to work as one unified political entity. The 
opportunity was especially appealing because of the tense political climate, varied previous 
national interactions with Iran post-revolution, and the potentially extended timeframe that the 
diplomacy would require. The platitude “high risk, high reward” reflects the overall nature of the 
decision to make a European attempt at leading the negotiations. Since the EU’s ability to 
function as one is often doubted on the international stage, the high-risk topic of a nuclear Iran 
offered a chance to prove their political power as a Union.  
 Europe initiated significant dialogue on Iran’s nuclear proliferation in the 1990’s. When 
it became clear in 2002 that Iran’s actions were duplicitous, the EU made a second major push 
for diplomacy. These were the negotiations that culminated in the Tehran Declaration56 57. In this 
push for diplomacy and soft power instead of strong-arming, Europe aimed to demonstrate its 
own negotiation abilities and keep the repercussions for Iran’s nuclear activities away from the 
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UN Security Council, where the US might force a reactionary or violent response58. However, 
the EU’s efforts in this regard ultimately saw little success as Iran violated the agreement within 
the year. When Ahmadinejad came into the Iranian presidency, the hopes for Europe’s progress 
on the negotiations virtually disappeared. 
 In addition to an attempt to assert their soft-power prowess, the EU holds economic 
motivations for keeping the international reaction to Iran calm and open. In the early 2000s, 
Europe was Iran’s largest source of imports at 37%59. Therefore, Europe faces business losses 
whenever the international community enforces sanctions on Iran. They were politically forced 
to comply with nuclear sanctions during the Ahmadinejad presidency, but the JCPOA 
negotiations offered a point of re-opening and progress that would allow a return to investment. 
Common business interests between the EU and Iran include energy, transportation, and agro-
business. The EU also prefers to have the option to import Iranian oil when tensions rise with 
Russia. Using these business opportunities, it seems that Europe maintains a soft power 
approach60. When dialogue began after Implementation Day, topics went beyond the expected 
economic spheres and into areas such as human rights and civil protection61. This shows 
Europe’s continued effort to use dialogue to fight instability and danger, an adherence to a soft 
power stance. The approach is summed up by the EU High Representative as “a dialogue of the 4 
C’s: comprehensive, cooperative, critical if needed, constructive always.62” 
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United States 
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Secretary of State John Kerry 
[Early negotiations: Undersecretary for Political Affairs Wendy B. Sherman] 
Support for the JCPOA in the United States continues to be controversial, with domestic 
political allegiances factoring heavily into individual’s considerations. In the Obama 
administration’s efforts to unify the national position on the issue, safety and security rhetoric 
prevailed as the factors necessitating diplomacy. Negotiators and supporters emphasized the 
realistic benefits of the deal and lack of reliable alternatives. They also stressed the significance 
of the world power coordination in the overall agreement and length of negotiating process. In 
contrast to other nations, economic considerations took a lesser role, with the finance ministry’s 
involvement serving as expertise on the sanctions regime rather than assessing potential for 
forthcoming business opportunities if a deal were to be signed63.  
The primary refrain, and consequently primary motivator, of the United States during the 
JCPOA dialogue was the importance and goal that Iran not obtain a nuclear weapon64 65. This 
included details on the four pathways to a bomb and constant reminders of Iran’s nuclear 
abilities up to that point66. The non-proliferation focus included mention of the NPT, but greater 
emphasis appeared in relation to regional stability. However, while other countries kept this 
notion fairly broad, perhaps mentioning Israel or violent conflicts but not their own national 
interest, the US adamantly listed support of their allies under reasons to support the political 
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dialogue with Iran. Their argument was that a regulatory agreement that limited current nuclear 
capabilities and installed IAEA mechanisms for the foreseeable future protected Israel and the 
Gulf states from the looming threat that was a nuclear Iran67 68. This is a significantly less 
friendly stance than many of the other P5+1 contributors, and yet still faced backlash nationally. 
 Hardliners maintained a stance that negotiations were rushed, completed for time rather 
than the necessary precautions that would restrict or even remove Iran’s nuclear capacity. An 
important counter to that stance, which reinforces the ideas of safety and security, was the power 
and repercussions of the world powers agreeing on the deal. After a year and a half of dialogue, 
the United States would be the only nation to step away from the agreement if they so chose. 
This would be an isolating action for all international policy moving forward, but also undermine 
the work of the sanctions regime69. Some considered continued and more severe sanctions an 
alternative to the soft power communication, but those involved insisted that sanctions motivated 
Iran to the negotiating table, they served their purpose on the nuclear topic. Therefore, the US 
found two primary motivations as the talks progressed: the ally-focused safety they spoke about 
before the process and international cohesion which they realized midway. 
 Some speculation remains about former president Barack Obama’s underlying 
motivators. Since the US-Iran cooperation on the JCPOA marks such a rastic change in bilateral 
relations, even those that take place within a multilateral framework, questions persist about 
whether Obama had long-term goals attached to the JCPOA beginnings70. Namely, whether the 
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far-reaching plan of the Uninted States was to warm relations with Iran, lessening the sense of 
enemy so that commong ground and more intense cooperation would be enabled in the future. 
The long-term outlook is certainly a possibility. Obama was nearly one generation removed from 
the Iranian Revolution, and may not have felt the underlying mistrust as strongly as his 
predecessors. Just as the United Kingdom and Europeans suggest working outward from the 
nuclear topic into other human rights violations and concerns, coering one topic at a time, the 
United States coulf be considering a very gradual change in approach to its relationship with 
Iran. Enabling economic growth in Iran and attributing that progress to Rouhani would also 
theoretically promote the Reformist political movement in Iran’s domestic politics. This would 
encourage future cooperation with the West71. If the Obama administration is thinking and acting 
according to long-term consdierations, future cooperation would be a third cause of US support 
for the JCPOA, one masked by the rhetoric of stability, safety and security needed to keep 
hardline US politicians satisfied. 
 
Iran 
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif 
 Iran’s participation and cooperation in the JCPOA negotiations depended on the nation’s 
cost-benefit analysis of nuclear sovereignty and economic mobility72. It was a balance between 
hardliners in the government and IRGC who opposed international cooperation and moderate 
elements who saw a need for sanction relief and considered the nuclear problem the best option 
for the problem. While the former place extensive value in the ideological opposition to the 
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West, the United States in particular, their rhetorical hardlining was increasingly jeopardized by 
the effect of sanctions on the overall economy73. Ayatollah Khamenei’s rhetoric maintained the 
strict anti-West stance even after the deal was signed, but he also approved the deal as he spoke 
against its limitations74. The contradiction grew from a recognition of need, an argument 
perpetuated and encouraged by President Rouhani.  
 In his support of negotiations and the finalized deal, Rouhani often focuses on the 
repressed oil sector and overall depression of the economy resulting from international sanctions. 
In the 2000’s, the international community increased their sanctions against Iran with each 
additional nuclear discovery75. Even Iran’s typical allies and oil export destinations limited their 
intake and communication. When this international economic squeezing compounded with 
plummeting oil prices, Rouhani pushed enough emphasis behind the need to receive Khamenei’s 
approval for dialogue76. For added safety and concern, Rouhani supplemented the discussions 
with the international threat of war against Iran77. This economic motivation coincides with the 
public’s idea of the worth of the JCPOA, as they expected and hoped for better access to foreign 
medication and equipment, an increase in investment, decrease in unemployment, and higher 
living standards as a result of the lowered sanctions which the international community conceded 
with the JCPOA78. 
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 However, underlying political strategy is also relevant in Iran. If Ayatollah Khamenei is a 
proxy for the tradionalist and hardliner elite and President Rouhani is his moderate counterpart of 
a younger time, both took a gamble on the JCPOA in the hopes of stabilizing their political 
ideologies and actions. Both politicians saw potential benefit in a stronger economy. For 
Khamenei, economic growth would stabilize his position and ensure that retained Guardian 
Council support. If the country’s economy can grow while he continues his anti-West rhetoric, 
there is no need for a change. Rouhani, on the other hand, wanted to demonstrate how much 
potential increased world cooperation and sanction relief could affect. As a the moderater of the 
deal and driving force behind Foreign Minister Zarif’s negotiating tactics, his campaign for re-
election would be supported by the improved economy. Perhaps the public would see him as a 
positive change and offer the reform ideas more support, instead of limiting their view to the 
status quo. Therefore, Iran’s national motivations for entering the deal depended on economic 
incentives. However, the economic incentives also drove individual’s poltical aspirations. 
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Chapter 4:  
Meeting Progression79 
 
 
 
 
Tehran Declaration 
The Tehran Declaration was the 2003 culmination and temporarily successful result of the 
European powers nuclear negotians with Iran. It followed the discovery of Iran’s secret nuclear 
facilities in Natanz and Arak, a revelation provoked by the National Council on Resistance on 
Iran, an Iranian opposition group. France and the European Union’s JCPOA motivations above 
outline the basic elements and progressions of the negotiations which followed from the 
announcement. Iran was likely motivated to participate because of IAEA and United Nations 
resolutions condemning their actions. 
 The main consequence of the agreement was that Iran would suspend its uranium-
enrichment activities. This was a departure from Europe’s initial goal of eliminating all 
enrighment rather than simply suspending it, but marked significant improvement in overall 
regulations. The deal was signed in October, but broken by June of the following year when the 
IAEA reported violations and a lack of cooperation by Iran. Negotiations were meant to continue 
to try to reconcile the differences, but subsequent election of former President Ahmadinejad 
effectively negated this progress. In 2004 and 2005 the violations escalated, with the UN 
Security Council finally stepping in. The entire project of diplomacy was marred by the back-and 
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forth nature of the agreements. Negotiations were disjointed until approximately 2012, but the 
P5+1 began to collaborate almost immediately, offering proposals for constructive means of 
cooperation. 
 
JPOA 
The JPOA was signed in November 2013 after the initial positive negotiations of the P5+1 and 
Iran. Productive meeting began in April 2012 and were gradual. Rouhani’s June 2013 election 
arrived with promises of increased transparency, giving the efforts motivation to continue in the 
meantime. Overall, the JPOA marked the progress made so far, main points and goals of each 
side of the negotiations, and stood as political representation of progress with a promise for 
additional cooperation to finalize the details of a full agreement. The document resembles the 
final JCPOA agreement, but lacks the descriptive detail and step-by-step processes that make the 
comprehensive deal unique.  
 The JPOA operated along a six-month first phase for Iran to begin scaling down its 
uranium and nuclear activities as a further sign of support for the dialogue and potential for 
continued progress despite the lengthy nature of the negotiations. Implementation truly begain in 
January of 2014 with IAEA support and monitoring. The organized implementation process and 
signing of this interim agreement acted as a calming measure for the negotiations. It was an 
international symbol of progress and continued effort as well as an appeal to outside leaders and 
actors showing that the conversations were worthwhile and worth continuing. Since the 
negotiations took place over such an extended period and had such a vast history of violation and 
disruption, this partial agreement aimed to counteract any fears or misgivings mounting with the 
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passing of time. It also set up the Framework for Cooperation Agreement which initiated IAEA’s 
full return to Iran.  
 
JCPOA 
The JCPOA is the finalized agreement between the P5+1 and Iran. It operates along a 20 year 
framework, sets limitations on Iran’s uranium enrichment and centrifuge and heavy water 
production, effectively extending Iran’s breakout time and transforming the nuclear sector into a 
peaceful and energy-focused body. The agreement was signed in July 2015, but implementation 
was gradual and included affirmation by the Iran and US national governments. The following 
mark the primary developments and are interspersed with IAEA reports tracking Iran’s 
adherence to coinciding agrements and the JPOA: 
-February 2014: The seven negotiating nations agree on a framework and schedule for 
negotiating the final, “comprehensive” deal 
-May 2014: comprehensive agreement drafting begins 
-Novemer 2014: an extension is required, moving the political agreement goal to March and 
technical annexes to the end of June 
-14 July 2014: Finalization Day, this means the deal is announced approximately two weeks after 
the deadline and inspite of French concerns over rushed final details 
-20 July 2014: the UN Security Council endorses the deal and proposals for lifting UN sanctions 
-September 2014: oppositionists in US Congress fail to garner enough support to block the deal 
-October 2014: Iranian lawmakers approve the deal, leading to the Guardian Councils 
ratification. Formal adoption (Adoption Day) occurs on the 18th.  
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-16 January 2015: Implementation Day, this means that the IAEA verified Iran met its de-
nuclearization commitments and EU and UN sanctions officially lift 
 
From this point on, the provisions are to be continued and reviewd by the IAEA. Two remaining 
dates will occur if the process is implemented on all actors’ parts: 
-20 October 2023: Transition Day, this day will matk the permanent lifting of all thus-far 
provisionally-lifted sanctions and Iran will begin the process of ratifying the Additional Protocol 
-20 October 2025: UNSCR Termination Day, this day will mark the United Nations decision to 
close the case on Iran’s nuclear program, essentially resolving the issue as within international 
norms and standards 
 
Beyond these two days, the agreement sets up general monitoring procedures that transition into 
the longest-term accomplishment: the Additional Protocol.  
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Chapter 5:  
Conclusions & Moving Forward 
 
 
 
 
 After splitting motivations for a nuclear deal with Iran into the national interests of each 
primary negotiating nation-state, it becomes clear that incentives flow from political and 
economic foundations. Political can be further divided into international community reputations 
and MENA region stability. The former of these political motivations refers most significantly to 
Iran, Russia, China, Germany, and the EU. The remaining actors, the United States and United 
Kingdom, enjoy a safer position in the existing world order, and so their political standpoint on a 
nuclear Iran revolves more strongly around the latter incentive, MENA regional stability. 
However, all actors cite regional stability in their support of the JCPOA deal as an international 
accomplishment. 
 Regional stability considerations frequently occur in tandem with declarations of 
allegiance to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and, in some cases, 
global nuclear disarmament. When brought into the context of MENA and current violent 
conflicts, frequent references include the safety of the Israeli state, human rights violations in 
general, migration concerns, and the violent conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. When dealing 
with Iran, the international community is especially concerned that a nuclear acquisition would 
incite a military response from already nuclear-armed Israel, or that it would add extreme 
measures of military support to oppressive regimes in Iran and Syria because of the Islamic 
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State’s political alliances. Others fear nuclear capabilities reaching Hezbollah, heavily present in 
Lebanon, supported by Iran, but considered a terrorist organization by international standards. 
 These regional concerns form the basis of many arguments brought up against the 
JCPOA, but the agreement attempts to standardize and add a safety-structured monitoring 
element to the Iranian nuclear program. Given the existing rate of nuclear development, most of 
the primary actors cite the JCPOA as the safest and most realistic alternative to Iran’s nuclear 
weapon acquisition. For this reason, the agreement is largely considered a stabilizing factor, as it 
brings in new regulations and IAEA review systems and adds nuclear activity restrictions that 
significantly extend Iran’s breakout timeline. The overall concern for safety enumerated by the 
world powers repeatedly in press statements during and after the negotiations suggest a 
prominent concern for international well-being. However, when economic considerations are 
compared to the safety-rhetoric, national interests prevail as the true motivations. 
 All members of the P5+1 excluding the United States enjoy recent or current economic 
relations with Iran that are restricted by international sanctions against Iran’s human rights 
violations, missile activity, and nuclear program. Recent UN sanctions in particular focus on the 
nuclear developments, and so all countries subject to the UN Charter face business limitations. 
With a large population, space for foreign investment, weak infrastructure, consistent oil sector, 
and projected economic growth, business investment in Iran offers many paths for expansion. 
Russian, Chinese, and European finance administrations began to explore these possibilities as 
soon as possible after the JCPOA signing. Though some conversations coincided with regional 
safety and humanitarian concerns, economic opportunities dominated the main points of 
dialogue. With these actions and considerations in mind, the concern for international safety 
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argument loses potency. Regional stability still matters to foreign actors, but national economic 
interests and growth potentials constitute the true motivation for that stability and safety concern.  
 One possible exception to this underlying economic drive is the United States. Though 
private companies based in the US look forward to the opening Iranian market as sanctions 
slowly decrease, as evidenced by the Boeing contracts pending official government approval, the 
national stance demonstrates a lesser focus on finances and continuously circles back to safety 
rhetoric. The safety and NPT focus with a constant reiteration of assessment standards based on 
review not trust by JCPOA-supporters reflects the atmosphere of distrust that continues to 
underlie and taint all interaction between the United States and Islamic Republic of Iran. The 
events leading up to and embodying the 1979 Islamic Revolution continue to impact the 
country’s perceptions of each other, particularly among conservative hardliners, as outlined in 
Chapter 2 above. This prevents full realization of bilateral economic potential and puts dialogue 
into a refrain of safety concerns. 
 The national dynamics of reformist ideology and conservative hardline stances play a 
prominent role in the motivations and considerations of Iran and the United States, in particular. 
The ability to sustain dialogue across a multi-year span and amidst additional international 
disagreements shows a shift in balance in the dynamics of both countries. One example of the 
change in the United States political sphere can be seen by comparing the JCPOA negotiations to 
the Tehran Declaration attempts. In the early 2000’s, Europe found it wise to garner US support 
through soft power means because they feared a reactionary and violent response if the UN 
Security Council, where the United States holds veto power and significant influence, took 
control of the Fordow revelation response. The European fears stemmed from US political and 
military decisions under recent administrations, such as President George W. Bush’s entrance 
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into war in Iraq and overall inauguration of the War on Terror. Strict and military actions from 
hardline stances predominated the US action on the world stage in general and MENA region in 
particular. Combining this trend with the historical tensions perpetuating a freeze of US-Iran 
relations created a dynamic too risky to have the US forming responses to Iran. However, the 
Obama administration created a new international dynamic for the United 
 States, working with hardliners to reinforce ideas of safety in relation to Iran while also 
exploring diplomatic options that allowed the JCPOA. 
 In Iran, the change of presidencies also reflects the balancing acts of traditionalist and 
reform ideologies. When Europe initiated diplomacy in the early 2000’s gradual, though 
inconsistent, progress prevailed until the election of former Iranian president Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad. At that point, all dialogue and cooperation ceased until his successor, current 
President Hassan Rouhani, stepped into the role. Rouhani represents the Reformist movement in 
Iran and an overall recognition of the importance of international participation. In the latter 
perspective, he reflects former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s recognition of Iran’s 
potential gains from cooperation on the world stage. President Rouhani enabled increased 
dialogue with his reformist rhetoric nationally and globally in his UN speeches, demonstrating 
that Iran’s government included rational actors willing to negotiate for its country’s best 
interests.  
The changing dynamics in these countries therefore coincided in the mid-2010’s in a 
spirit of reform and recognition of the role of international diplomacy. The other P5+1 members 
supported and recognized these trends and the roles they could play nationally to enact a nuclear 
deal. The dynamics in their own governments show a variation in hardline (France) and 
sovereignty-oriented (China) stances, but the group as a whole focused on the potentials and soft 
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power opportunity to add stability and economic potential on the global market. The unique 
combination of actors in all parties, then, enabled the JCPOA signing. 
Additional research is necessary to assess the validity of conclusions drawn here 
regarding reform actors and economic motivations taking primacy over political incentives. 
Motivations in particular offer an opportunity for further investigation. To weigh the relative 
effects of political/humanitarian and economic determinants, future research should review the 
meetings of P5+1 members and Iran since the signing and implementation of the JCPOA. To the 
extent available, the focus of this additional investigation should be the primary topics of 
subsequent dialogue. Categorizing the interactions according to the titles and national roles of the 
diplomatic leaders participating in the dialogue against the publicized reports on main discussion 
topics would provide additional insight into the true nature of JCPOA motivation. 
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